President Tokayev has recently made digital transformation a central pillar of Kazakhstan’s modernization, aiming to build a “Digital State” that streamlines public services and expands e-governance. Kazakhstan’s ambition to become a digital state within three years also carries geopolitical dimensions. We can be a model for Central Asia. Digital sovereignty is not merely a technological or economic task but a new dimension of national security and geopolitical multi-vector policy.
Whichever country’s technology we choose, we inevitably fall under its influence; therefore, the main challenge for Akorda is to maintain balance between China’s digital expansion and Western technological partnership. The platform is still contested: Chinese models offer low-cost infrastructure and surveillance capacity, while Western approaches emphasize interoperability, transparency, and data protection. In practice, Kazakhstan might likely pursue a hybrid path, combining Chinese hardware with Western software standards to preserve its multi-vector balance in technology.
Trump’s recent state visit to the UK signaled a shift in alliances, with the Tech Prosperity Deal focusing on AI, nuclear energy, and quantum computing, following his transactional trade pact with the EU. These moves show that the transatlantic partnership is now anchored in strategic sectors, not ideology. For Kazakhstan, caught between Russia, China, and this renewed bloc, the challenge is to stay relevant without choosing sides. Multi-Vectorism must adapt to a world defined by resources, supply chains, and technology platforms. As the world’s leading uranium producer, Kazakhstan can be more than an exporter, using its resources to drive joint research, reactor technology, and clean energy innovation.
As Europe looks for alternatives to Russian routes, Kazakhstan’s Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor becomes strategic. Investments in ports, logistics, and digital customs can make Kazakhstan the hinge of Eurasian digital connectivity, offering secure passage for goods and data alike. In a world racing for dominance in AI and quantum computing, Kazakhstan cannot compete head-on, but it can carve out a niche by positioning Astana as a hub for AI governance and ethics, expanding Bolashak scholarships into frontier technologies, developing regional cyber-security cooperation to protect Central Asian sovereignty from great power rivalry.
A looming sensitive challenge in the region is digital dependency and telecommunications security. Over the next five years, it is feasible that Chinese Telecom companies might be preparing to enter or deepen their presence into Central Asia, including Kazakhstan. There is my concern that if 5G networks are fully deployed, let’s say, replacing Russian Beeline, Beijing theoretically could indirectly control some information flows and gain unrestricted access to strategic data. For citizens the key issue is cheaper internet and fast online banking platforms. Nepal’s recent social unrest is often cited as an example, where some experts view Chinese information influence as a possible or hidden factor in the turmoil. Should China acquire the technical capacity to monitor any country’s elections or state decision-making processes in real time, it would pose a direct threat to national sovereignty in future.
For Kazakhstan, cybersecurity and independent infrastructure are paramount. On the one hand, the country has recently launched an American Starlink satellite internet and connected to an Emirati-American NVIDIA-based supercomputer system, reinforcing its information sovereignty. Following this news, Chinese firms were more active. If the platform for the Digital Kazakhstan project is China-made, and the data might be left susceptible to foreign oversight, it would pose a risk for data security and internal stability. If a country fails to build its own digital shield, it risks being ruled not by ballots, but by bandwidth.
Kazakhstan can also engage with western companies cautiously while preserving ties with Russia and China. Partnerships with mid-level powers like Turkey (drone tech and military collaborations), South Korea (smart city), India (digital sovereignty and data laws), the UK, can reinforce security without triggering any tension. In today’s world, sovereignty is measured not in tanks or treaties, but in servers and software. Platforms like the CICA forum provide credibility as a neutral mediator in this field.
Astana has long been seen as a bridge between Soft power and public diplomacy in Eurasia. Hosting dialogues on climate, AI governance, and nuclear security would not only amplify Kazakhstan’s soft power but also lock in its role as a neutral convener in a polarized world.
But there are risks on the horizon: overdependence on countries that do not respect human rights could make Kazakhstan vulnerable to shifting geopolitics. Neighboring countries’ sensitivities demand careful management, Astana must demonstrate that diversification is not abandonment. Kazakhstan risks becoming digitally colonized if it leans too heavily on one power, whether Asia or West. At the domestic level, Kazakh citizens must see tangible benefits of digitalization: new jobs, education tools, innovation, if multi-vectorism is to remain sustainable. So, in the tech and AI domain multi-vectorism must be a basis of national security. The fight for digital sovereignty might be the new great game of Central Asia.
The Trump-Starmer alignment is possibly the dawn of a new global order in the tech domain. New transactional alliances will be built on energy, tech, and defense. For Kazakhstan, this is both a test and an opening. Astana’s response should be bold but balanced: we can use uranium and logistics as leverage, invest in tech and cyber sovereignty, and reinforce soft power diplomacy as a safety net. Multi-vectorism once kept Kazakhstan safe. In its 2.0 version, in an age of fragmented alliances, In the 21st century, Kazakhstan’s independence will not be measured by borders alone, but by its ability to master the politics of technology.
Zhanat Momynkulov
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