From Alignment to Divergence: the complexity of Türkiye-EU Relations in Erdogan’s 2004 speech

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From Alignment to Divergence: the complexity of Türkiye-EU Relations in Erdogan’s 2004 speech

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Author: Bayram Atici

                                                           Analysis (1969-2010)

The early 2000s marked one of the most intense, promising, yet contentious periods in the relationship between Türkiye and the European Union (EU). During this period, Türkiye’s reform processes in line with its full membership objective and the EU’s enlargement policies have brought both structural and political impasse between the parties. In this study, the course of Türkiye–EU relations will be analyzed on June 21, 2004, based on the speech of the then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the opening of the National Social Policy Symposium on the EU Cohesion Process, organized by his party at the Hilton Hotel in Ankara.

Türkiye–AB relations are institutionalized by the Ankara Agreement signed in 1963, and the perspective of full membership between the parties has been clearly defined from this date.[1] The agreement states that Türkiye will prepare for full membership after a 22-year transition period.[2] However, domestic political instability in Türkiye, military interventions, and especially the tensions that emerged after Greece’s accession to the EU in 1981 significantly disrupted this process.

It is noteworthy that in its 1976 report on Greece’s accession,  the European Commission foresaw that relations with Türkiye could be adversely affected. The Commission stressed that special measures should be taken to ensure that Türkiye’s rights arising from the Ankara Agreement are not harmed.[3] In the following years, these rights were mostly violated; financial aid to Türkiye under the Customs Union was blocked due to Greece’s veto, and free movement decisions have not been implemented by many European countries.[4]

Türkiye’s full membership application in 1987 was rejected because of a lack of democratic and economic conditions there.[5] Despite this, Türkiye continued its commitment to integration with the EU in 1995’s Customs Union. It is understood that the Customs Union is considered a step towards the membership process not only economically but also politically for Türkiye.[6]

The recognition of Türkiye as a candidate country at the 1999 Helsinki Summit marked the beginning of a new phase in EU–Türkiye relations. Following the EU Council’s adoption of the Accession Partnership Document on March 8, 2001, which outlined short- and medium-term priorities for Türkiye’s alignment with the Copenhagen Criteria, Ankara responded promptly by adopting the National Program for the Adoption of the EU Acquis merely ten days later, on March 19. Between 2001 and 2004, Türkiye undertook sweeping reforms, including eight major legislative packages—two of which were constitutional—and significant parliamentary reforms. These changes were accompanied by extensive amendments to primary and secondary legislation.[7] During this period, all branches of the state, alongside political parties, civil society, the media, and influential organizations such as TÜSİAD, İKV, and TOBB, mobilized to meet the EU accession requirements. The Turkish Parliament operated at full capacity to pass necessary legislation, despite opposition debates and delays.[8]

In a 2004 speech, Prime Minister Erdoğan emphasized that Türkiye was more prepared than many existing EU member states, stating:

“Türkiye is certainly far more prepared for the EU negotiation process not only than the countries currently in negotiations but even than many that have already become full members.”[9]

With these remarks, Erdoğan emphasized that Türkiye was undergoing not only a technical transformation but also a paradigmatic shift and that the reforms were not limited to legislative changes but were also reflected in institutional practices. Believing that Türkiye was ready to join the EU, Erdogan viewed the postponement of the process for political reasons as a development that would harm the credibility of Europe.

Furthermore, in his speech, Erdoğan also pointed out that “this is a negotiation process, not full membership. We may have shortcomings, but even full member states have not yet fully implemented the EU acquis.”[10] With these remarks, he drew attention to the fact that countries like Bulgaria and Romania – then still in negotiations – as well as Hungary and Poland – both regarded as the most developed among the ten states that joined in May of that year[11] – also had democratic and financial deficiencies at the time of accession.[12] This illustrates that the EU’s enlargement standards have varied depending on the country and context and that Türkiye has been subjected to higher benchmarks.

At the Brussels Summit held on 17 December 2004, it was agreed that Türkiye met the Copenhagen criteria, and it was decided to start negotiations on 3 October 2005. However, the subsequent Negotiation Framework Document set out the EU’s intention to impose a special status or concessionary partnership on Türkiye instead of full membership. The document emphasized an “open-ended” process different than previous enlargements,  used misleading statements such as adherence to Türkiye’s pace of fulfilling its membership obligations, and politicized negotiations by highlighting the Southern Cyprus factor. The threat that negotiations could be suspended and exceptional arrangements, such as decision-making by a qualified majority,  have shown that the EU aims to keep Türkiye in orbit rather than integrate it.[13] Due to the vetoes of Southern Cyprus and the obstructions of France and Germany, 8 chapters were suspended in 2006, and 6 more chapters were blocked in 2009.[14] Even so, the AKP government continued the reforms, but due to the ambivalent stance of the EU, until 2017, 16 chapters out of 35 were opened, and just one had been provisionally closed.[15] These developments in the following years show that the negotiations between the EU and Türkiye turned into a political issue.

This position is clearly reflected in Erdoğan’s remarks:

“If Türkiye is kept waiting again after December 2004, we will begin to look for other explanations… Europe must not become a symbol of the clash of civilizations. The EU should be a symbol of the reconciliation and meeting of civilizations. Türkiye will join the EU as a representative of the reconciliation of civilizations. I believe that once this is achieved, the EU will send a different message to the world. They will be able to say, ‘We are no longer just a Coal and Steel Community as we were at our founding. We are not a Christian club either’. This will be their proof.”[16]

This statement indicates that Türkiye is seeking to join the EU not only through technical competencies  but also through a cultural and civilizational-based affiliation. Erdoğan emphasizes that the EU should be an address of reconciliation of civilizations instead of being a Christian club and states that Türkiye is an actor who can contribute to this vision.

Erdoğan’s speech portrays Türkiye not merely as a candidate for EU membership but as a pivotal cultural and geopolitical actor uniquely positioned to enrich the Union’s foundational values and global vision. Between 2000 and 2005, Türkiye made significant progress both in terms of reform processes and economic stability. However, the political and cultural reservations on the EU side indicate that the accession process has been guided more by political contingencies and normative biases than by consistent, objective criteria. Today, the issue of membership has re-emerged on the agenda, driven by both Türkiye’s growing regional and global role and shifts in the EU’s strategic priorities. Nevertheless, the future of the process depends not only on technical reforms but also on the ability of both parties to build mutual strategic trust.

Bibliography:

  • Anghel, Veronica, and Erik Jones. 2024. “Three Lessons from the 2004 ‘Big Bang’ Enlargement.” Politics and Governance 12. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.8358.
  • Çalış, Şaban H. Türkiye–Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri: Kimlik Arayışı, Politik Aktörler ve Değişim (Turkey–European Union Relations: Identity Quest, Political Actors and Change). Ankara: Nobel, 2016.
  • Çalış, Şaban H., and Kısmet Metkin. “Algı ve Yanılgı: AB Normları, Türkiye’nin Üyeliği ve AK Parti’nin Rolü” (Perception and Fallacy: EU Norms, Turkey’s Membership, and the Role of the AK Party). Marmara Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi 25, no. 2 (2017): 1–39.
  • European Commission. Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1989. Accessed February 3, 2017. http://aei.pitt.edu/4475/1/4475.pdf.
  • European Economic Community (EEC). Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey (Ankara Agreement). September 12, 1963. Official Journal 217, December 29, 1964. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/1964/732/oj/eng.
  • European Economic Community (EEC) Commission. Opinion on Greek Application for Membership. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/76. Luxembourg: European Communities, 1976.
  • Karluk, Rıdvan. Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye (The European Union and Turkey). İstanbul: Beta, 2005.
  • “Erdoğan: AB Tarih Vermezse Burada Başka Şey Ararız” (Erdoğan: If the EU Doesn’t Give a Date, We Will Seek Something Else Here). Hürriyet, June 21, 2004. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogan-ab-tarih-vermezse-burada-baska-sey-arariz-38617216.
  • Sevimli, K. A., and S. Reçber. “Avrupa Birliği’nde İşçilerin Serbest Dolaşımı ve Türk İşçilerin Serbest Dolaşım Hakkı” (Free Movement of Workers in the European Union and the Right of Turkish Workers to Free Movement). İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası 72, no. 2 (2014): 391–440.

Main Source of the Paper

https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogan-ab-tarih-vermezse-burada-baska-sey-arariz-38617216 Published Date: 21 June 2004                                                                                  


[1] Şaban H. Çalış and Kısmet Metkin, “Algı ve Yanılgı: AB Normları, Türkiye’nin Üyeliği ve AK Parti’nin Rolü,” Marmara Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi 25, no. 2 (2017): 14. (“Perception and Misconception: EU Norms, Turkey’s Membership, and the Role of the AK Party,” Marmara Journal of European Studies)

[2] European Economic Community and Turkey, Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey (Ankara Agreement), September 12, 1963, Official Journal 217, December 29, 1964, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/1964/732/oj/eng.

[3] European Economic Community (EEC) Commission, Opinion on Greek Application for Membership, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/76 (Luxembourg: European Communities, 1976).

[4] Rıdvan Karluk, Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye (İstanbul: Beta, 2005); K. A. Sevimli and S. Reçber, “Avrupa Birliği’nde İşçilerin Serbest Dolaşımı ve Türk İşçilerin Serbest Dolaşım Hakkı,” İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası 72, no. 2 (2014): 391–440. (“Free Movement of Workers in the European Union and the Right of Free Movement for Turkish Workers,” Istanbul University Law Review)

[5] European Commission, Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1989), accessed February 3, 2017, http://aei.pitt.edu/4475/1/4475.pdf.

[6]  Şaban H. Çalış and Kısmet Metkin, “Algı ve Yanılgı: AB Normları, Türkiye’nin Üyeliği ve AK Parti’nin Rolü,” Marmara Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi 25, no. 2 (2017): 16. (Perception and Misconception: EU Norms, Turkey’s Membership, and the Role of the AK Party,” Marmara Journal of European Studies)

[7] Ibid., 17.

[8] Ibid., 18.

[9] “Erdoğan: AB Tarih Vermezse Burada Başka Şey Ararız,” Hürriyet, June 21, 2004, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogan-ab-tarih-vermezse-burada-baska-sey-arariz-38617216. (“Erdoğan: If the EU Doesn’t Give a Date, We’ll Look for Something Else Here,”)

[10] Ibid.

[11] Desmond Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 276.

[12] Anghel, V., & Jones, E. (2024). Three Lessons From the 2004 “Big Bang” Enlargement. Politics and Governance, 12. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.8358

[13] Şaban H. Çalış and Kısmet Metkin, “Algı ve Yanılgı: AB Normları, Türkiye’nin Üyeliği ve AK Parti’nin Rolü,” Marmara Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi 25, no. 2 (2017): 27. (Perception and Misconception: EU Norms, Turkey’s Membership, and the Role of the AK Party,” Marmara Journal of European Studies)

[14] Şaban H. Çalış, Türkiye–Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri: Kimlik Arayışı, Politik Aktörler ve Değişim (Ankara: Nobel, 2016). (Turkey–European Union Relations: The Quest for Identity, Political Actors, and Change)

[15] Şaban H. Çalış and Kısmet Metkin, “Algı ve Yanılgı: AB Normları, Türkiye’nin Üyeliği ve AK Parti’nin Rolü,” Marmara Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi 25, no. 2 (2017): 30. (Perception and Misconception: EU Norms, Turkey’s Membership, and the Role of the AK Party,” Marmara Journal of European Studies)

[16] “Erdoğan: AB Tarih Vermezse Burada Başka Şey Ararız,” Hürriyet, June 21, 2004, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogan-ab-tarih-vermezse-burada-baska-sey-arariz-38617216. (“Erdoğan: If the EU Doesn’t Give a Date, We’ll Look for Something Else Here,”)

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